Submission to the Superannuation Inquiry 2019

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This submission is quite brief because (a) you will ignore it anyway (b) I have been retired for quite a few years (c) for a decade I have been in my own smsf only and do the accounting and administration for that fund. I am willing to co-operate further is asked to do so. For quite a few years I was active in commentating on/criticising Australia's superannuation system and created and taught an introductory superannuation course at QUT in Brisbane. This was offered as both an undergraduate and a postgraduate course. I have written numerous papers on superannuation and had them published in various places.

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(1) The whole thrust of Australia's superannuation regime is that large funds are either owned or controlled by the employers and/or by financial firms such as banks/insurance companies. This is immoral because the money in the funds represents members' retirement savings which were taken from employees under a compulsory scheme. In all funds except SMSFs, there should be:

a. AGMs
b. Election of trustees
c. Voting on trustee, executive, and consultant remuneration in advance

Please see my paper "Why Australia's pension system is not a good international model.", Discussion Paper 12/99, **The Pensions Institute**, London.

(2) The Accounting standard for Australian superannuation schemes is ludicrous. It is full of anomalies because it reflects the above premise – that members are not the (residual) owners of the fund. Thus the accounting is totally different from the accounting for companies which reflects the fact that shareholders are the residual owners of same. As a result, figures have to be juggled in order to complete the tax return forms for super funds. However, I am NOT advocating that academics or the accounting bodies get commissioned to draft a new accounting standard. AAS 25 is the result of their past efforts. Please see (for example) my paper "AAS 25: An accounting enigma?", **Accounting Forum**, October 1993, pp. 70 to 92.

(3) FULL reporting of board and executive remuneration and perqs (including travel, food, drink, and accommodation, entertainment and perqs/allowances or similar for spouses or mistresses) is necessary, and relevant budgeted expenditure should require MEMBER (excluding employer) approval IN ADVANCE and an AGM, with over expenditure in excess of 5% paid by the board of trustees. There should also be prior member approval and full

disclosure of direct and indirect donations and loans to unions, political parties, and office bearers of same. All of these are currently hidden as operating expenses in highly summarized financial reports.

(4) Funded defined benefit funds should be banned because they are a fraud/scam. (See complaint about Unisuper below.) Also, please see my paper " Are defined benefit plans fundamentally a fraud?", **Australian Superannuation Law Bulletin**, November 1996, pp.34-35. See attached.

(5) Higher compulsory contributions for women because they live longer.

(6) Double compulsory contributions where the relevant spouse does not work full time.

(7) Same contributions compulsory for self employed persons as for employees.

(8) Higher contribution rate so that it will fully provide for the period of retirement of each member, based on life expectancy of the individual. Yes this may mean higher contributions for immigrants.

(9) Same contribution rate by members irrespective of income is wrong. Varied contribution rate so that it will fully provide for the period of retirement of each member, based on (a) likely/extant income (b) life expectancy of the individual (c) the same pension/retirement income for all members, irrespective of remuneration during their working lives. Those desiring a higher standard of retirement income can save/contribute for it.

(10) First $1,000,000 of superannuation balance must be taken as a pension or rolled over to a super fund with the same proviso. Too many people with too little super take a lump sum and quickly spend it in order to then put their hands out for an aged pension and all the other welfare benefits possible. This defeats the whole purpose of compulsory superannuation.

(11) Annual members' statements and PAYG statements must show full contributions for each financial year. **At present members of large funds cannot easily satisfy themselves that all the contributions that should have been credited to their super fund accounts, have been credited.** Consider making super fund reporting date (for the normal financial year) December 31 each year with member statements and PAYG slips to show full contributions paid or due for each year.

(12) Employers should have NO INPUT (direct or indirect) into the management of superannuation funds for their employees.

(13) Members (only) to vote on the appointment of their fund's trustees. Nominees must fully disclose their certified relevant qualifications and experience. Eg Marketing manager union super fund – high 6 figure salaries but knew NOTHING of super and had no relevant experience.

(14) Fees paid to investment consultants are grossly excessive and should be voted on by members in advance. There should be a limit on churning.

(15) Duplication of fees paid to certain fund administrators eg SSAU CEO paid a salary AND trustee fees, and Byers (founding trustee) paid remuneration as a trustee of the corporate trustee. After retirement (and before?) Byers was generously paid a daily fee as a fund trustee/consultant.

(16) Time and costs of having an SMSF: Over a financial year, I would spend no less than a fulltime week doing accounting and administration (including preparing the tax return) for my smsf. Unfortunately it dominates my life. Interest rates are very low yet I still have to pay $700 audit fee PLUS $259 ATO admin fee. Other pay much more AND an accountancy fee – for what benefit? Why do no other taxpayers have to pay to lodge their tax returns? Surely if smsfs which are in pension mode simply lodge details of their assets and benefits accrued by members, then an audit and "administration fee" should not be necessary. The present arrangement undermines the whole purpose of SMSFs. I would spend AT LEAST a whole, full-time week on accounting, administration and tax return preparation for my smsf. It is ridiculous. That is not what retirement is about.

(17) Having nominal females (or anyone) on trustee boards if they are clueless with respect to superannuation, their presence is counter-productive because that only concentrates power in the hands of a smaller number of men/sharks.

(18) Unisuper (a large industry fund)

a. **Very brief history**

In the dark ages, each Australian university had its own superannuation scheme. Some of these were so well run that they were on the verge of insolvency. The VC and bursar of the University of Tasmania set up a fund called SSAU (Superannuation Scheme for Australian Universities). Very quickly it became a national fund and all staff (academic, research, white collar, and blue collar) of the vast majority of Australian universities were FORCED to become members of this fund as a condition of employment. Those already in a government fund did not have to join unless they changed universities. When compulsory "employer" superannuation contributions were introduced nationally (a labor con for idiots), the tertiary education union (NTEU) started a second fund into which employer contributions on behalf of university staff, were made. This completely separate fund was called TESS (Tertiary Education Superannuation Scheme.) and it had its own board of (union) trustees etc. Years later, SSAU and TESS amalgamated to become Unisuper. Unisuper still exists today.

b. Structure

SSAU was a funded defined benefit fund. These are not very common, and are disgraceful scams, not superannuation schemes. In the case of SSAU, the fund was set up to deliberately defraud the vast majority of members via the defined benefit formula (Years of membership X final average salary X benefit factor of .21, exactly the total contribution by each member and the employer-university) This ensured that most members suffered sub-optimal returns in order to provide above optimal returns for a small minority of members, particularly senior academic staff. To the best of my knowledge, the disgraceful situation continues today for most Unisuper members. Similarly the board changed the fund rules very shortly before Mr Byers (a founding member of the board of trustees) got a large salary increase and retired. The final average salary part of the define benefit formula was changed so that it was averaged over a shorter number of years when Mr.Byers got a big salary increase. Most salaries of academic staff (at least) were suppressed for about 20 years, and so (a) massive surpluses were accumulated (b) only the few senior academic staff who got large salary increased/promotions derived superior benefits from the fund. After agitating by people like me, SSAU eventually gave members a 12 month window to change to a new accumulation fund that was set up within SSAU in parallel with the DBF. Those who changed had no way of knowing whether they got a fair share (if any) of the massive surplus that had been built up because of the fund's formula and the suppressed academic salaries. In addition, because so many people knew very little about superannuation, some people still wanted to change to the accumulation fund after the window closed, but were not allowed to do so. They continued to be scammed. The employer and trustee concern was that if too many people left the DBF, the surplus would shrink to the level that the employing universities would have to make contributions to finance the member benefits. Please see SSAU's reply to my paper criticising SSAU "The Piggy Bank Barney", NTEU Advocate May 1996, pp.25 - 28.) See attached.(From the title one can deduced how seriously NTEU took members' interests.

c. **Consultative committee**

   The fund members were powerless to change the situation because the employers dominated the consultative committee which eventually started to meet annually. The agenda for these meetings was set by the trustees and the meeting chair appeared to be pre-arranged by the trustees. Also because of arranged member representative vacancies on the consultative committee, employer representatives on the consultative committee outnumbered member representatives.. Also there were a couple of member representatives hoping to be appointed to the board of trustees and they also undermined the member representatives. Sadly, the consultative committee was an EXPENSIVE waste of time.

d. **Membership bias, knowledge**

   Clearly the fund was/is biased against the vast majority of members (both academic and non academic) eg. One fast track female was given a salary increase in recent years of $167,000 p.a. With a defined benefit fund, the benefit of members assumes that they have been on their final average salary (3 years) for their ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF THE FUND, and that both they and their employer(s) have been contributing at the rate appropriate to that FAS. Clearly where large salary increases occur, those members derive a benefit GROSSLY disproportionate to their lifetime contributions (and earnings on same). In a defined benefit fund, that disproportionate benefit CAN ONLY BE DERIEVED if the majority of members get SUB-OPTIMAL BENEFITS (because there is a limited pool of funds in a DBF, out of which ALL benefits are paid). SSAU and UNISUPER ARE SCAMS, NOT SUPERANNUATION SCHEMES. The trustees and VCs who agreed to force university staff into these funds should be prosecuted for fraud, embezzlement or whatever. SSAU and Unisuper trustees definitely were/are NOT acting in the best interest of ALL the members as SIS requires them to do. Unisuper now describes itself as an industry fund, which does not surprise me, given that NTEU did nothing about this superannuation scam for decades, despite being alerted to the problem. They also did nothing about the suppressed salaries in the tertiary educations sector for decades. SSAU and Unisuper were used to promote people who supported the educational corruption of Australia's tertiary education system, and used as levers to retire academics who did not upgrade their qualifications and/or did not publish in "acceptable" journals (ie. ones refereed by professors - corrupt or otherwise.)

The Piggy Bank Barney

Accumulated or defined benefit scheme. That is the question being asked in a debate raging amongst the superannuation congnoscente. Ron Champion from SSAU argues for the current defined benefit model, whil Dan Schewe from QUT puts a vigorous case for a change to the accumulated model. The Advocate invites oth contributions from members on this debate, or on any aspect of superannuation.



Is SSAU Equitable?

Ron Champion
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, UNI SUPER

While there are mathematical ways to measure it, equity is essentially in the eyes of the beholder. In superannuation the debate for years has been whether equity is better measured by inputs (which favour accumulation schemes) or outputs (which favour defined benefit schemes).

From its start in 1983 SSAU was deliberately planned to operate on the defined benefit model. Lump sum benefits are expressed as multiples of salary in the years immediately preceding retirement, resignation or death; optional retirement pensions are calculated as percentages of salary over the same years.

The lump sum multiples and pension percentages depend on length of service, adjusted where appropriate for fractional appointments. Benefits are not therefore based directly on contributions paid by employees and universities plus investment earnings, and so contrast with the typical "industry" superannuation plans, including TESS.

Some critics argue that this structure belongs to another era, and needs re-examination because of increased contract employment among university staff, greater turnover and more intermittent careers. A more specific concern has been that different salary patterns lead to systematic cross-subsidies from general staff to academic staff, or from female members to male members.

Standard contributions to SSAU are 7% of salary by members and 14% by universities and other employers. Only about 17.5% of the total of 21% is available for investment to produce re
ment benefits as follows -

(% of salary)	
(A) Member contribution	7.
(B) University contribution	14
	21
Less	
(C) Death and disablement insurance cost	1.
(D) Administration cost	0.
(E) Tax (15% of (B) - (C) - (D	1.
	17
Multiple of member contribution	2.

Measured by inputs equitable
efits payable on retirement, or ea
resignation, should therefore be exp
ed to be about 2.5 times employee
tributions plus interest.

At the commencement of SS
members transferring from inadequ
ly funded separate schemes operate
a number of universities were gra
full past service benefits. Since
SSAU has received other transfers
example from USS in the United K
dom, where the standard relationship
tween member and employer contr
tions does not hold.

After excluding those spe
groups, who together represent less
15% of membership, the benefits a
ally paid since extra benefits were gr

ed out of surplus on 1 December 1994 have represented the following multiples of the members' contribution plus interest.

Group	F	M	Total
Academic	2.69	2.61	2.63
General	2.61	2.55	2.56
Total	2.65	2.58	2.61

The accompanying graphs show the ratios of vested benefits for continuing SSAU members to their contributions plus interest, subdivided by years of entry and attained age. The only conclusion from this analysis is that there are no systematic cross subsidies by gender, or between academic or general staff. The differences in the table above are mainly the result of the different histories of the groups because SSAU marginally favours shorter serving members.

The UniSuper Strategy Committee, in association with unions and the AVCC, is nevertheless proceeding with a thorough benefit audit to ensure that SSAU remains in the forefront of superannuation schemes.

Graph 1
Ratio of vested benefits to members' contributions plus interest



Graph 2
Ratio of vested benefits to members' contributions plus interest



University Superannuation: Super Scheme or Super Scam?

Dan Scheiwe
QUT

Many academic and many non-academic staff in Australian universities are involuntary members of a defined benefit superannuation scheme known as the Superannuation Scheme for Australian Universities (SSAU). All of those people are also involuntary members of a newer (defined contribution) superannuation scheme known as the Tertiary Education Superannuation Scheme (TESS). Thus many employees of Australian universities are members of either or both of these superannuation plans. Effectively, both of those plans have a common corporate administrator - Unisuper Management Ltd., but each has its own corporate trustee.

In his covering letter to NTEU dated 1.9.95, Ron states that his article "Is SSAU Equitable?" is "...more or less an edited version of a more detailed paper recently discussed between the Unisuper Board and NTEU. In an earlier paper dated 28.7.95 and titled "Cross Subsidies Within SSAU (a paper for SSAU's strategy committee)", Ron states (p.1):

At the Consultative Committee Meeting held in November 1994, Mr Scheiwe of QUT tabled a paper entitled "What Superannuation surplus?". This followed an earlier paper of his entitled "Disclosure Implications of Superannuation Plan Bias". ...The simple illustrations of inequities or cross subsidies within Mr Scheiwe's papers have been criticised as an inadequate analysis". This article aims to give a better picture of the level of cross subsidies between groups of SSAU members.

A substantial part of my bias paper dealt with the inequity of superannuation plans such as SSAU. Thus the article which Ron has submitted to NTEU for publication appears to be in direct response to my papers on biases and surpluses in superannuation plans such as SSAU. This is also strongly suggested by the fact that substantial passages are common to both Ron's paper and article referred to above. It is also interesting that:

(a) Ron's figures in his article focus on the post 31.12.94 position ie. After amendments to the SSAU Trust deed made some 6 months after I delivered my bias paper at a colloquium which he attended for the first time because it included criticism of SSAU;

(b) in his message accompanying the 1994 annual report of SSAU, the Chairman of its corporate trustee claimed that the $300m surplus in SSAU (which was higher using an alternative calculation method) was used to improve average benefits for members from $148,000 to $170,000. This occurred only when the "surplus was distributed, at 31 December 1994" (Chairman's Message, 1994). Again this occurred 6 months after the release of my bias paper.

Both of my earlier papers and this article acknowledge that the criticisms which I make in respect of SSAU are not unique to that superannuation plan. They are a reflection on the deficiencies in many Australian superannuation plans and the appalling system for regulating superannuation in this country. Of course that does not mean that employees in the tertiary education industry have to be satisfied by the superannuation arrangements currently thrust upon us.

How SSAU works for some but not for most

The major thrust of my "bias" paper is that SSAU discriminates against various categories of members. Particular concern was expressed in my "bias" and "surplus" papers that because SSAU is a defined benefit plan, it favours members whose salaries increase fastest. Many media reports have highlighted the decline in real salaries of most employees in tertiary education and in contrast, the substantial increases in salaries of most senior academic and administrative staff in the same industry. Those salary increases can result in windfall gains in superannuation benefits of hundreds of thousands of dollars - yes, that's EXTRA superannuation benefits - which can be derived with relatively little additional contribution. Where is the money coming from to fund those massive windfall gains? Unfortunately it is available because most members of SSAU are eligible for sub-optimal benefits. To put it another way, the assumptions underlying our SSAU plan are very conservative, as are the basic benefit available to members. The recent massive surplus in SSAU is clear evidence of this situation, though some would have us believe that it was due to management of the fund. The extent to which most members' benefits were/are sub-optimal can be gauged by the size of that surplus even after funding the massive windfall gains for the privileged minority.

The only "winners" out of SSAU are those whose salaries increase faster than average for SSAU members. The most common occurrence of that situation has been for a small percentage of senior academic and administrative staff whose salaries have jumped very substantially in recent years, who in some cases are paid loadings which now attract superannuation benefits, and some of whom have obtained large salary increases by changing senior positions within the higher education industry. For example, based on media reports, the income of the VC of Macquarie University recently jumped about $50,000 p.a. and the income of the VC of the University of Tasmania will jump by at least $55,000 p.a. when he becomes VC of Melbourne University[1]. Depending on the details in each case, these increases could result in ADDITIONAL superannuation benefits of about $500,000 each[2]. This is quite different from the average increase of $22,000 reported in the SSAU chairman's message referred to above. One can imagine the skewness in the graph showing the distribution of those improved benefits. However, no doubt you will feel wonderful at having contributed to such worthwhile causes.

Exactly how did you contribute? Have a look at the defined benefit formula in SSAU. It states that benefits are calculated as YRS x FAS x BR ie. Years of members of SSAU, times final average for the last 3 years of membership[3] times the benefit ratio. In effect, the benefit ratio less the percentage of salary contributed to SSAU by and on behalf of members is the annual simple interest paid to members (assuming no salary increases[4] and no administration and death/disability insurance). After the most recent generous improvements in BR, the maximum BR (for the lucky ones) is .21. Ring a bell? Yes, that is the same percentage of salary that is contributed to SSAU by and on behalf of members! So what rate of return are you getting on contributions to (ie. Investment in) SSAU? The answer is, at best, zero and in some cases it is negative! What a great investment!! However, that is only the case for mere mortals whose real salaries don't increase. If you are one of the privileged minority who can arrange for substantial salary increases and loadings then you can more than offset the abysmal base rates of "return" from SSAU. But remember, who is getting those attractive rates of return and who is paying for them? Isn't it wonderful that membership of SSAU is compulsory for so many of us?

What is SSAU's response to this criticism?

Ron's research which was reported in his paper and article was supposed to be based on empirical evidence and was supposed to overcome the inadequacies of my papers and "set the record straight". However, in a least 12 places in his response to my papers (which he prepared for the Strategy Committee of SSAU - a copy of which NTEU now has), he explicitly admits that cross subsidisation occurs in SSAU, but alas, those admissions are not contained in the "more or less edited version" he sent to NTEU for publication.

In addition, in my reply to his response I challenge his research methods which were supposed to overcome the deficiencies caused by my not having access to relevant empirical data. For example (this is only an abridged version of my reply), he claims that benefits should be about 2.5 times employee contributions plus interest.

Since employee contributions are only 1/3 of total contributions made by and for members of SSAU, then according to Ron, the benefits "should be" .83 times total contributions (ie. 2.5/3). That means (on his figures) that members should get back about 83% of contributions made by and for them! What a ripper investment! You only lose 17%!

But what, you ask, happened to the profits generated by the management of SSAU in recent years? There are administration costs to pay and cross subsidisation to fund, and to be fair in this commentary, salaries (and hence benefits from SSAU) do increase. It's just that some increase much much more than others!

A second major concern about Ron's figures regarding what members' benefits should be, is that they assume (like the way SSAU is run) that members are not entitled to a pro-rata share of the profits. Ron refers only to a hypothetical interest figure which he does not consistently use anyway eg. his benefit: member contribution ratio of 2.5 ignores his hypothetical interest and any share of profit. Where are the profits going? The answer is largely in cross subsidisation.

The third and final concern I shall raise here about Ron's figures is the fact that the macro approach to analysis he used masks the real figures which are the focus of concern in my earlier papers, namely that a privileged minority of members of SSAU are deriving well above the average returns out of SSAU as a result of cross subsidisation by the vast majority of members who are deriving sub-optimal returns. Had his analysis compared (for example) the returns of senior academic and administrative staff relative to other members, then the resultant picture would have been very different from that which he has painted.

Superannuation trustees have both statutory and common law duties, including a duty of impartiality. I believe that the duty of impartiality (at least) requires that the trustees be proactive in bringing issues such as cross subsidisation to the attention of all members.

Conclusion

The above criticisms are not unique to SSAU and certainly I am not the only one to have made them. They can be levelled at many Australian superannuation schemes because of the deficient regulation system. In Australia, the accountability of companies to shareholders is far superior to the accountability of superannuation plans to their members. Given what has happened/is occurring in our listed companies despite the higher standard of accountability, there is reasonable grounds for concern about the system for regulating Australian superannuation plans.

While there is an urgent need to reform the system for regulating Australia's superannuation industry (despite government platitudes), of more immediate concern to employees in Australia's higher education industry must be the review and revision of our superannuation arrangements. As many superannuants will attest, we cannot rely on blind faith. As part of the revision, I strongly urge that SSAU be FULLY converted to a defined contribution scheme immediately because I firmly believe that SSAU is not equitable.

The problems with SSAU that I mention in this article only persist because its consultative committee is powerless and the board of the corporate trustee is dominated by the employer universities. This is permitted by Australia's quite irrational superannuation legislation.

If you would like to comment on, are willing to provide more examples of deficiencies in our university superannuation arrangements, or receive regular comment on our superannuation arrangements, please write to/email the Association of Superannuants in Australia c/- d.scheiwe@qut.edu.au.

References

1. In another reported instance, the salary of a Vice-Chancellor doubled shortly before retirement.

2. To calculate the relevant net benefit in each case, deduct the contributions made to SSAU after the salary hike. The net benefit is maximised by retiring/resigning 3 years after the salary hike.

3. Conveniently reduced from 5 years at about the same time that senior academic and administrative staff were getting their substantial salary increases.

4. This assumption is not far from the real situation for many members of SSAU and is likely to continue to be so given the federal government's Superannuation Guarantee legislation and associated industrial relations policy.

Ron Champion replies

SSAU was designed to provide defined benefits related to members' salaries in their final years of employment, which are arguably the best available measure for living standards at retirement. Many earlier university schemes, and particularly those operated on an accumulation basis, had failed to provide adequate benefits.

Defined benefits schemes tend to favour members whose salaries in their final years, relative to the averages over their careers, are higher. The purpose of my article was to dispel myths that SSAU systematically discriminated against groups such as women with short service or male general staff. The results speak for themselves.

Mr Scheiwe insists on ignoring the two great inevitabilities of life - death and taxes. My article shows that, after allowing for them, UniSuper has only 2.5 times member contributions (83% of gross contributions) to invest. For the same reasons an accumulation scheme based on similar contributions, and providing a similar level of insurance against death and disablement, would generate benefits of about 83% of gross contributions plus interest.

Mr Scheiwe also persists in ignoring that my comparisons are based on contributions plus interest, as he has in earlier papers. Because interest is recognised my article compares SSAU benefits direct with the likely results of an accumulation scheme which he espouses.

Dan Scheiwe replies

My point has consistently been that SSAU is a biased scheme. This fact is admitted by SSAU's actuary and several times by Mr. Champion. In addition, while he has chosen his words carefully, he has not denied that a select few members are deriving huge windfall gains from SSAU and that these are financed by cross subsidisation by the majority of members.

Again using Mr. Champion's figures, the thumb-nail sketch below indicates for a hypothetical case involving no salary increase, just how much worse off many members of SSAU may be relative to investing elsewhere. Increasingly, low salary gain is a reality for many university staff (eg. because of the superannuation guarantee levy).

The above table assumes that: only 83% of gross contributions is available to invest; an investment return of 8.75% annually, which is one of the actuarial assumptions in SSAU; 15% tax is paid on the investment income (Mr. Champion has taken into account the tax on employers' contributions in calculating the 83% available to invest). Column 6 (Co. 1 x Col. 2 x 21) shows the benefit available from SSAU assuming a benefit ration of 21%. Column 5 shows what members should get after tax (.15) and other costs (.17) if SSAU contributions were invested elsewhere at the actuary's assumed earning rate for SSAU (8.75%). Column 7 shows by how much, the member whose salary does not increase, is worse off by forced membership of SSAU. Based on the $8715, the member's rate of return from SSAU is 1.253% and based on $10,500, it is .001%. Within limits, SSAU's earning rate has nothing to do with the rate of return members derive from it.

Employer contributions are part of the remuneration of SSAU members and should be dealt with for their benefit, rather than being used to cross subsidise a select few. To that extent SSAU is a scam. This is not the fault of the current board of the corporate trustee, though I consider that their duty of impartiality requires that they draw attention to the bias issue.

There is not space here to debate the most appropriate superannuation arrangements for Australia's university staff but I do think it appropriate to point out the recent exodus from defined benefit plans in the USA. SSAU is a defined benefit plan but TESS is not.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Years of SSAU Membership	Annual Salary	Yearly Contribution 21%	Available.to invest 83%	Benefit .85x0.875	SSAU Benefit (BR+21%)	Lost Benefit
5	50000	10500	8715	50557	52500	-1943
10	50000	10500	8715	122928	105000	17928
15	50000	10500	8715	226523	157500	69023
20	50000	10500	8715	374816	210000	164816
25	50000	10500	8715	587091	262500	324591
30	50000	10500	8715	890955	315000	575955